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Through much of the last half century, Medicare and Medicaid have not for
the most part supported research intended to lead to new drugs. For their role in
drug development, we need to look to infrastructure and incentives. The record of
the National Institutes of Health (NIH) illustrates the potential of both for
pharmaceutical innovation. The current budget of NIH, the big elephant in the zoo
of the federal biomedical enterprise, is $30 billion, but apart from a dozen small
programs devoted to targeted drug development, most of these billions are not
aimed directly at pharmaceutical innovation.'
Yet the NIH investment in biomedicine has indirectly fueled drug development
in the private sector to a huge degree. It has paid for the training of biomedical
scientists and clinicians, many of whom went on to staff the drug industry,
especially its laboratories. NIH-sponsored research has also generated basic
knowledge and technologies and it has encouraged universities to spin out their
potentially useful findings into the industry by allowing for the patenting and
licensing of the findings.2
Like NIH, Medicare and Medicaid have helped fuel drug development
indirectly by supporting selected experimental cancer treatments, medical
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education, and some clinical research and training.3 But investment in these
activities has been small and their impact on drug development apparently very
limited. In contrast to NIH, the Medicare and Medicaid stimulus to drug innovation
has resided not in the production of new scientists or the patented uses of new
knowledge but principally in markets and pricing.
The sizable expansion in the medical market that came with Medicare and
Medicaid drew a number of companies into the generic drug business, a type of
innovation, many of them from outside the pharmaceutical sector. The Sunday
Herald Tribune noted in January 1966: "Whatever the future trend of generic-drug
sales may be, many companies are jumping into the swim. Only last week Cott
Corp., chiefly a dispenser of soft drinks, announced it was forming a unit to sell 'a
full line' of generic drugs."
Not long after the passage of Medicare and Medicaid, the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare called for the use of generic drugs "whenever it is
practicable and economical." Champions of generic substitutes predicted that the
shift from brand names would save taxpayers some $100 million annually.4
Generics now comprise some 80% of U.S. prescriptions.'
During the latter third of the twentieth century U.S. pharmaceutical companies
devised hundreds of new drugs that won Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approval. One might think that the growth was stimulated in part by the increase
in the size of the population over 65, which rose from about 18 million in 1965 to
about 46 million in 2013, an increase of 28 million people, or 255%. The effective
measures and drugs for overcoming infectious disease helped extend life spans and
allowed for the expression in much higher frequencies of chronic disease. During
this period, pharmaceutical companies stepped up their investments in research
and development (R&D)-between 1975 and 1990, in constant dollars from $2
billion to $6.6 billion.
But neither the general increase in the size of the senior population nor
Medicare and Medicaid was responsible for this output, or within it for new drugs
for the treatment of diseases that occur with greater frequency among older or
impoverished Americans.6
3. Id. See also Medicare and the American Social Contract: Final Report of the Study Panel on
Medicare's Larger Social Role: Restructuring Medicare for the Long Term Project, NAT'L ACAD. OF
Soc. INs., 16 (1999), http://www.nasi.org/usrdoc/med-report-soc-contract.pdf.
4. JEREMY A. GREENE, GENERIC: THE UNBRANDING OF MODERN MEDICINE 67, 295 n.8 (2014).
5. John Lechleiter, Beyond the Fiscal Cliff, Pharmaceutical Innovation is the Key to Long-term
Fiscal Health, FORBES (Dec. II, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlechleiter/2012/12/1 l/beyond-the-fiscal-cliff-pharmaceutical-
innovation-is-the-key-to-long-term-fiscal-health.
6. PHARMACEUTICAL R&D, supra note 1, at 30, 43; Daron Acemoglu et al., Did Medicare Induce
Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 103,103-07 (2006).
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I. WHY THE WEAK ROLE OF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID IN PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION?
It is difficult to explain a negative and the data is sketchy, but enough is
available to suggest hat a plausible answer lies in Medicare and Medicaid policies
for prescription drugs. In the case of Medicare, the reason seems to have been a
restricted market; in the case of Medicaid, it was seemingly limitations on pricing.
Federal support of prescription drugs for Medicare patients was for the most part
confined to drugs that were incidental to in-patient medical services provided in
hospitals and approved clinics.7 Otherwise, resources for prescription drug
payments were limited. In 1987, family funds paid the costs of 56% of
pharmaceuticals; private insurance, which presumably involved negotiated prices
and by and large did not likely cover seniors, only 27%.'
As for Medicaid, federal policies established between 1990 and 1992
compelled drug manufacturers to negotiate rebates with HHS for drugs given to
state Medicaid patients by safety net providers and sell drugs to comparable
outpatient clinics at discounted prices.
9
The development and FDA approval costs for a new drug run upwards of a
billion dollars. Thus, given the government's Medicare and Medicaid market and
pricing policies, we should not be surprised that drug companies did not focus their
efforts at innovation on drugs targeting the afflictions of the elderly or the poor-
who suffer, for example, high rates of mental health problems such as bipolar
disorder.'° Manufacturers evidently counted the prospective payoffs inadequate to
warrant the investment; they looked for their principal profits to the general and
open pharmaceutical market, where they could charge whatever prices the market
or private insurance companies would bear for products under patent.
II. A GAME CHANGER: THE MEDICARE DRUG BENEFIT
Circumstances changed dramatically with the passage of the Prescription
Drug Act, or PDA, in December 2003.1 The act was a response to the increasing
dependence of senior outpatients on a long list of costly medications, including
those for heart disease, cancer, osteoporosis, hypertension, arthritis, diabetes,
7. Margaret Blume-Kohout & Neeraj Sood, The Impact of Medicare Part D on Pharmaceutical
R&D, (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13857, 2008).
8. PHARMACEUTICAL R&D, supra note I, at 28.
9. 340B DRUG PRICING PROGRAM, http://www.hrsa.gov/opa (last visited Dec. 14, 2014).
10. Milt Freudenheim, A Windfall from Shifts to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2006,
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/18/business/i8place.html.
11. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat 2066.
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gastrointestinal disease, and Alzheimer's disease.12 It provided them assistance in
paying for prescription drugs through a combination of tax breaks and subsidies.
It went into effect in 2006 through Medicare Part D.
The PDA, which passed by a hair-thin margin, had been highly contested, not
least over the key issue of pricing. The pharmaceutical industry lobbied hard
against any arrangements that, like those governing drug prices under Medicaid
after 1990/1992, would subject prescriptions to prices negotiated by Washington.
The industry won its battle.3 The PDA prohibited the federal government from
negotiating discounts with drug companies for Medicare and Medicaid patients
and from establishing a formulary-that is, a list of acceptable prescription drugs
for particular conditions. Both functions were left to private providers such as
insurance companies and HMOs.
The PDA also turned 6.5 million Medicaid patients who were eligible for
Medicare into so-called "dual eligibles," people whose medical services remained
in Medicaid but who, for their prescription drugs, were moved out of the Medicaid
class of regulated drug prices into Medicare Part D. The migration significantly
enlarged the market for drugs sold at uncontrolled prices.14
In response to the PDA's enormous expansion in the prescription drug market
for seniors and the free-for-all pricing it allowed, the pharmaceutical industry
increased its research-and-development expenditures sharply beginning in 2004.
And the increase went heavily for drugs used by Medicare beneficiaries. 5
All the while, the PDA produced a windfall for the drug industry. In 2006,
when the PDA went into effect, Medicare Part D enrolled about 22.5 million
people, 29% of them the dual-eligibles (total enrollment reached 30 million by
2013). The price of brand-name drugs had climbed about three times faster than
the rate of inflation and pharmaceutical revenues had skyrocketed. 16
III. INNOVATION-BUT AT THE RIGHT COST AND FOR THE RIGHT PURPOSES?
The pharmaceutical industry defended its high prices, revenues, and profits by
insisting that all were necessary for its investment in the research and development
that would produce new prescription drugs. The industry deployed multiple
arguments: such drugs saved considerable money in other health-care costs and
improved quality of life. A vibrant and innovative drug industry also helped grow
12. Blume-Kohout & Sood, supra note 7, at 16.
13. Morgan Cook, Medicare Part D: Profit Trumps Public Interest, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Dec.
30, 2013, http://www.ocregister.com/articles/beneficiaries-594505-drug-drugs.html.
14. Another 45 million people remained eligible for prescription drugs in rebate-covered state
Medicaid programs. Freudenheim, supra note 10.
15. Blume-Kohout & Sood, supra note 7, at 12, 15-16.
16. Id. See also Cook, supra note 13; Freundenheim, supra note 10.
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the American economy and make the nation more globally competitive. According
to a study by the Congressional Budget Office, imposing price controls on
Medicare Part D would reduce pharmaceutical investment in R&D, risking costs
to the economy and to the availability of new, life-saving drugs. ' 7
But from a public-interest point of view, the price of innovation has been
remarkably high, perhaps indefensibly so. The Department of Veterans Affairs is
legally permitted to negotiate drug prices and establish a formulary for allowable
medications. It pays on average between 56% and 63% of the prices charged for
drugs under Medicare Part D. 1
8
Costs aside, much of the pharmaceutical industry's increased investment in
R&D appears to have been concentrated in medical areas where effective
medications already existed. Companies aimed to gain market share by producing
me-too drugs rather than by seeking new drugs with consequential benefits for the
treatment of disease.19
In 2013, nineteen Senators introduced a measure-the Medicare Drug Savings
Act-that would curb the price increases by at least returning the dual-eligibles to
the Medicaid rebate arrangement, but it has stalled in the face of assiduous
lobbying by the drug industry. Senator Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, one of
the cosponsors, noted that even with the restoration of rebates, the economic and
policy environment for drug innovation would remain highly encouraging. He says
that the drug industry could well afford R&D, noting it spends far more on
advertising and marketing than it does on drug innovation.2 °
Drug-cost savings would of course be all to the good, helping to curb the
mounting fiscal threat to Medicare and Medicaid, but forcing pharmaceutical
companies to pay their fair share of the health system would not address the
question of how to encourage the development of new, medically consequential
drugs. Dealing with that conundrum might well require rethinking our approach to
drug innovation. Guidance might be found in how the military obtains the
technologies it needs. It does not rely solely on the initiatives of defense firms. It
provides incentives in the form of grants and contracts targeted at the innovation
17. Lechleiter, supra note 5.
18. Austin Frakt et al., Should Medicare Adopt the Veterans Health Administration Formulary?,
21 HEALTH ECON. 485, 487 (2012).
19. David Dranove et al., Pharmaceutical Profits and the Social Value of Innovation (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20212, 2012).
20. Press Release, Jay Rockefeller for West Virginia, Rockefeller and 18 Other Senators
Introduce Legislation to Protect Seniors & Reduce Deficit By $141.2 Billion (Apr. 16, 2003),
http://www.rockefeller.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2013/4/rockefeller-and-I 8-other-senators-
introduce-legislation-to-protect-seniors-reduce-deficit-by- 141-2-billion; WV-Sen: Join Jay
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of specific weapons systems and their components. The United States might
consider a similar strategy in the ongoing war against disease, introducing public-
interest considerations into the dominantly private, market-oriented system of drug
innovation that now prevails.
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